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1 Introduction
The role of markets in moral behavior is poorly understood. Economists and philosophers
usually study the boundary between markets and government, rather than the issue of
what should and should not be on the market. It has been hypothesized that market
interactions corrode moral values (Shleifer 2004; Radin 1987). In societal transition to
market economies, human economic mentalities were changed, and people became more
economically rational, behaving as neoclassical economic theory would predict (Polanyi
1944). Prior to the transition, people based their economies on reciprocity and redistribu-
tion and were not rational utility maximizers. This paper investigates one mechanism of
the great transformation–intermediation (Judge 2012)–by which market forces can shape
morality. Other aspects of market interactions–commodification (market alienability) and
competition–has been explored elsewhere (Chen 2016), so this paper explores the role of
intermediation and does so with an experiment.
Broadly speaking, the proponents of the doux commerce thesis (a theory popularized
by 18th century political philosophers) have proposed that markets, with its disruptive
effect on geographical and tribal isolation, will actually have morally improving effects,
increasing our care for and understanding of others. On the negative side, intermediation
gives individuals the possibility to justify taking egoistic actions while maintaining a
feeling of morality. People want to believe that they are moral–and may be motivated
less about outcomes or actions, and more about revealing themselves as moral beings. In
experiments where individuals could choose to allocate either a pleasant or an unpleasant
task to a partner and keep the other task, but had the opportunity to flip a coin to do
the allocation, 90% of individuals who chose to flip the coin assigned the unpleasant task
to the partner and felt more moral (Batson et al. 1997). In other experiments, individuals
want to avoid revealing to themselves what is the payoffs to the other so they could avoid
feeling moral disutility when choosing a selfish outcome (Dana et al. 2007). In vignette
studies, moral judgment of a litigation scenario changes if the subject knew which side
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they would be assigned to (Babcock et al. 1995). These and other studies of self-serving
interpretations on what is right or wrong lend possibility to intermediated moral decisions
becoming less pro-social.
In general, measuring how market experiences affect moral values is difficult. Inferring
causality from correlation is difficult since the causality can go in both directions. Or-
ganizations may foster dramatic changes in value orientations (Kohn 1986), but value
orientations can also foster economic change (Katz and Goldin 2000; Eriksson and Vill-
eval 2008). Pre-existing traits may drive selection into competitive environments. Such
self-selection makes it difficult to ascertain causal link between market conditions and
moral behavior (Fletcher and Nusbaum 2008; Ford and Richardson 1994; Detert et al.
2008; Dubinsky and Ingram 1984). Cross-sectionally, market integration was found to be
positively associated with moral behavior in the analysis of economic games measuring
social preferences (Henrich et al. 2001). In laboratory experiments with strategic settings,
however, someone who chooses to intermediate moral responsibility is less likely to be
punished by norm-enforcing third parties (Coffman 2011). This study investigates the
behavioral question, does intermediating moral responsibility change moral behavior even
in the absence of third party punishment. If so, what aspect of intermediation matters?
In particular, does algorithmic intermediation differ from social intermediation?
To study this question, I use a labor market intermediary, using a methodology simi-
lar to what the author has employed in other studies (Chen 2016; Chen and Yeh 2014;
Chen and Horton 2016). An advantage of contextualizing is that natural field experiments
mitigate potential Hawthorne effects relative to lab experiments (Orne 1962; Titchener
1967). Workers are recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk. The LMI is designed
to recruit a large number of workers in a short amount of time. Through an interface
provided by the LMI, registered users perform tasks posted by buyers for money. The
tasks are generally simple for humans to do yet difficult for computers. Common tasks
include captioning photographs, extracting data from scanned documents, and transcrib-
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ing audio clips. The LMI also allows a researcher to implement randomization although
randomization is not inherent to the LMI. Although most buyers post tasks directly on
the LMI website, they are also able to host tasks on an external site. I use this external
hosting method; I post a single placeholder task containing a description of the work at
the LMI and a link for workers to follow if they want to participate. The subjects are
then randomized, via stratification in the order in which they arrived at the job, to one
of several treatment conditions. Treatment is not revealed at this early stage. All workers
see identical instructions.
The experimental approach eliminates omitted variable biases where certain types of
individuals select into different market experiences. After workers complete data entry, I
ask them to grade the work of another. I observe the accuracy of the workers’ own data
entry as well as their evaluations of the accuracy of their co-workers’ data entry. Workers
are asked to propose a split of a 50-cent bonus with the other worker. The split of a 50-cent
bonus is a contextualized dictator game. I use this split to measure a workers’ altruism
(or moral behavior, conditional on the number of perceived errors of the co-worker). The
hypothesis is that increasingly intermediating responsibility for moral decisions can lead
to more selfish behavior, even if workers rate the data-entry task equally well. This is
likely to be true when intermediation is more asocial–maintaining or increasing isolation.
The results also relate a literature on whether altruism is deontological (Chen and
Schonger 2016; 2017) or egoist (Becker 1976). Under a deontological view, altruistic be-
havior should not change with the circumstances. We can think of the thought experiment
from Kant. In a classic vignette, a murderer asks you whether your friend is hiding in your
house (Kant 1797). In the categorical imperative, Kant would say, “You must not lie.” No
matter what the consequences are, you must tell the truth. Under the egoist view, indi-
viduals are altruistic only because they get some benefit from being perceived as being
altruistic. This would suggest that, as the circumstances of how an individual’s actions
are perceived change, the agent’s altruism will change as well. Another related literature
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is the impact of algorithms and machine learning on judicial decision-making. A large
collection of findings on the malleability of moral reasoning or decision-making by judges
can be modeled as shifts in reference points about what is the just and fair decision.1 In
an era when algorithms may be used in lieu of legal actors (Amaranto et al. 2018), an
open question is how this historical shift may impact judicial decisions.2
2 Methodology
The LMI can be used to implement anything from a natural field experiment to a labo-
ratory experiment (Harrison and List 2004). Workers come to the marketplace naturally
and are unaware they are in an experiment at the time of arrival, and this lack of aware-
ness alleviates the Hawthorne effects. Even if people become aware of an experiment, they
are unaware that other subjects receive different treatment conditions. The behavior of
subjects in this labor market intermediary is comparable to the behavior of subjects in a
laboratory and may be comparable to subjects in a real labor market (Barankay 2010).
The experimental design is shown in Figure 1.
I ask workers to transcribe paragraphs from a Dutch translation of Adam Smith’s The
Wealth of Nations. This task is sufficiently tedious that no one is likely to do it “for
fun,” and it is sufficiently simple that all market participants can do the task. The source
text was machine-translated to prevent subjects from finding the text elsewhere on the
Internet. Time and money are the most cited reasons for participation in Mechanical Turk3
1Malleability of moral reasoning by judges has been documented in U.S. federal circuit judges (Ash
et al. 2016; Chen 2017b; Chen et al. 2016b), federal district judges (Chen 2017a; Barry et al. 2016),
immigration judges (Chen et al. 2016d), sentencing judges (Chen and Prescott 2016; Chen and Philippe
2017), military judges (Chen 2017c), and juvenile judges (Eren and Mocan 2016). Some of these findings
can be attributed to snap judgments whether from analysis of the first three seconds of oral arguments
(Chen et al. 2016a; Chen et al. 2017a) or from early predictability of judicial decisions based on race or
nationality (Chen et al. 2016c; Chen and Eagel 2016).
2Outside the lab, the malleability of injunctive norms to formal institutions such as the law (Chen and
Yeh 2016b, 2014; Chen et al. 2017b) or markets (Chen 2015b; Chen and Lind 2016; Chen 2016) is
suggestive of the impact of broader historical shifts in human rights (Chen 2005), sexual harassment
(Chen and Sethi 2016), and free speech (Chen 2015a). This paper also shares the experimental approach
to measure normative commitments (Chen et al. 2016e; Shaw et al. 2011).
3http://behind-the-enemy-lines.blogspot.com/2008/03/mechanical-turk-demographics.html. Some work-
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Because subjects are unaware of an on-going experiment, differential attrition may arise at
the time treatment is revealed (Reips 2001). I minimize attrition through a commitment
mechanism. In all treatment conditions, workers face an identical “lock-in” task in order to
minimize differential attrition before the treatment is revealed. This lock-in successfully
reduces attrition (Chen 2016).
The payment for each paragraph is 10 cents. They are told there are three paragraphs,
all of which must be completed to be paid. A paragraph takes about 100 seconds to enter
so the offered payment of 10 cents per paragraph is equivalent to $86.40 per day. The
current U.S. federal minimum base wage for tipped waiters is $17.20 per day and the
federal minimum wage in the Unites States is $58/day. In India, it depends on the type of
work done, although the "floor" for data entry positions appears to be about $6.38/day.4
An example paragraph is displayed on the first page of the external hosting site so workers
are aware of the high payment before beginning work.
Paragraph Sample: De jaarlijkse arbeid van elk volk is het fonds die oorspronkelijk levert
hij met alle benodigdheden en conveniencies van het leven die het jaarlijks verbruikt, en die
altijd bestaan, hetzij in de onmiddellijke produceren van die arbeid, of in wat wordt gekocht
met die van andere landen. Volgens dus, als deze producten, of wat is gekocht met het, draagt
een grotere of kleinere verhouding tot het aantal van degenen die zijn om te consumeren, het
volk zal beter of slechter geleverd met alle de benodigdheden en conveniencies waarvoor zij
gelegenheid. Maar dit deel moet in elk volk worden geregeld door twee verschillende.
Each treatment group had different specifications about how the split would be imple-
mented, increasingly distancing the subject from his action by making the proposed split
ers do it out of need. A disabled former United States Army linguist became a Turk Worker for various
reasons and in nine months he made four thousand dollars (New York Times, March 25, 2007). Some
drop out of college to pursue a full time career with these disaggregated labor markets (Web Worker
Daily, October 16, 2008, Interview with oDesk CEO). For more information about the motivation and
demographics of Mechanical Turk workers, see, e.g. Paolacci et al. (2010).
4Payscale, Salary Snapshot for Data Entry Operator Jobs,
http://www.payscale.com/research/IN/Job=Data_Entry_Operator/Salary?, accessed June 17, 2011.
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less clear to an outside party.
After a lock-in task of 3 paragraphs, subjects are then asked to grade the task of another
worker. They compare a scanned text with another worker’s answer and enter the number
of errors found and the general assessment of worker quality (very low/low/fair/high/very
high). The task comes from data entry experiments involving summaries of court decisions
(Chen and Yeh 2016a,b). Treatment is revealed at the next stage. They are told they and
the worker whose work they just graded will receive a bonus and that they need to share
a ω cent bonus with the worker. The treatment groups are:
G1 Split (Control): Workers are told that their split of the bonus will be implemented.
G2 Peer Average Split: Workers are told that two others are also grading the same
work. The average of the three workers’ proposed splits will be implemented.
G3 Peer Random Split: Workers are told that two others are also grading the same
work. One of the three workers’ proposed splits will be chosen at random to be imple-
mented.
G4Computer Random Split: Workers are told that, with 2/3 probability, a computer
algorithm designed to optimize among data entries will implement its proposed split
instead of the worker’s split.
G5 Computer Modification: Workers are told that a computer algorithm designed
to optimize among data entries will modify their proposed splits of the bonus.
G2 and G3 provide a human component to intermediation while G4 and G5 provide non-
human intermediation. When workers prospectively think about peers, they become more
pro-social (Shaw et al. 2011). Thinking about one’s peers may be a mediating factor for
the effects of intermediation on moral behaviors. G3 is closest to G4 except the randomly
chosen split is among peers or with a computer. Note that this treatment differs from
standard diffusion of responsibility settings (volunteer dilemma) since it is not the case
that any of the graders can ensure a fair outcome (Dana et al. 2007; Darley and Latané
1968). G5 differs from G4 in that a computer will definitely as opposed to possibly deviate
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from the proposed split. It serves to some extent as a control for G4 in the event that simply
reminding individuals about computer algorithms may have a priming effect separate from
intermediation. The computer’s split in both G4 and G5 is a uniform random number.
The exact wording of the instructions are provided in the Appendix.
3 Experimental Results
Demographic characteristics are balanced across treatment groups, consistent with the
randomization of workers across treatment. Table 1 displays summary statistics by treat-
ment interaction. Males comprise 36% of the sample. 36% and 35% are from the United
States and India respectively. 25% are Christian, 28% are Hindu, and 16% are atheist.
The average age is 30. The average religious attendance is between once a year and once
a month. The average respect for parents and authority is between ‘a little’ and ‘a lot’.
After work has been completed, according to the original expiration date listed on the
LMI, bonuses are calculated and workers are notified of their earnings.
The empirical specification examines the effect of treatment on donation:
Donationit = β0 + β
t
1Treatmentit + β2Xit + εit(1)
Treatmentit represents the treatment group for individual i in treatment t and Xit repre-
sents individual demographic characteristics. Figure 2 displays the raw data means of each
treatment condition. Individuals assigned to Computer Random Split condition donated
the least. Figure 3 plots the distribution of the raw data, comparing the distribution of
donations in the Computer Random Split condition with the distribution of donations
in all other treatment conditions. Figure 4 plots the distributions only comparing the
Control (G1) and Computer Random Split (G4) conditions.
Table 2 reports ordinary least squares regressions. I also conduct a Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test, a non-parametric analog to the independent samples t-test, which can be
used when the dependent variable is not normally distributed, but at least ordinal.
The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test reveals that the Computer Random Split condition
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is statistically significantly different at the 1% level. Similar and statistically significant
results obtain when I compare only Control with the Computer Random Split condition
in the regression and in the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test. In a linear regression, the
Computer Random Split condition is also a statistically significant determinant of the
proposed split, at the 10 percent level. Workers in this group contribute about 2.8 cents
less than the control group. Column 1 displays the results without demographic controls.
Column 2 adds controls, which results in the loss of some observations due to non-response
on some demographic questions, but the effect remains quantitatively similar. Column 2
also controls for the perceived error of the recipient.
In results available on request, I find a number of patterns in the data that are consistent
with previous findings: workers deemed as providing higher quality work are given higher
bonuses (Eckel and Grossman 1996; Ruffle 1998) and men are less generous than women
(Andreoni and Vesterlund 2001; Eckel and Grossman 2008). These partial correlations,
however, disappear when the complete set of demographic controls is included.
Notably, among male subjects, the treatment effect is accentuated. Men donate 5.9 cents
less than the control group when assigned the Computer Random Split condition. The
effect is statistically significant at the 5% level. When examining only Americans or only
Indians, subjects assigned to the Computer Random Split condition donated the least.
Workers randomly assigned to peer treatment conditions (G2 and G3) display no effect
of intermediation on donations, which is consistent with online workers becoming more
pro-social when prospectively thinking about peers (Shaw et al. 2011). No effect is found
for direct computer modification (G5).
The great transformation of human mentalities into an economically rational cost-
benefit perspective has been attributed to the societal transition to market economies
(Polanyi 1944). This experiment has found that when asocial decision-intermediation
eroded indirect reciprocity norms and generosity towards others. In an algorithmic era, as
interactions become more asocially intermediated, decisions may become less social and
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other-regarding. This might suggest that market interactions corrode moral values only
when the interactions are asocial.
4 Conclusion
While economists primarily focus on efficiency, philosophers worry about how markets
leave their mark on social norms. Two oft-stated concerns are whether people become cor-
rupted or degraded when an aspect of the human experience is commodified and whether
market competition makes people immoral. Economists and psychologists have begun to
approach the issue: documenting repugnance of certain market transactions, negotiating
around taboo tradeoffs, and questioning why some normative arrangements are repugnant.
However, little empirical and no experimental research has been conducted on the issue
of market inalienability nor on the issue of market intermediation despite the potential
role for intermediation in explaining the financial crisis (Judge 2012). This paper takes
a first step in investigating the causal effect of intermediation on moral behavior, which
may have implications for behaviors in other domains, be they religion, law, or ethics.
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Figure 1: Experimental Design
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(9.9)
(9.7)
(10.0)
A
m
erican
0.4
0.4
0.5
0.4
0.4
0.4
(0.5)
(0.5)
(0.5)
(0.5)
(0.5)
(0.5)
Indian
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.5
0.4
0.4
(0.5)
(0.5)
(0.5)
(0.5)
(0.5)
(0.5)
C
hristian
0.3
0.3
0.4
0.3
0.3
0.3
(0.4)
(0.5)
(0.5)
(0.5)
(0.4)
(0.5)
H
indu
0.3
0.3
0.4
0.4
0.3
0.3
(0.5)
(0.4)
(0.5)
(0.5)
(0.5)
(0.5)
Atheist
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.2
(0.4)
(0.4)
(0.4)
(0.3)
(0.4)
(0.4)
Religiousness
2.4
2.6
2.5
2.8
2.6
2.6
(1.4)
(1.5)
(1.3)
(1.4)
(1.4)
(1.4)
4.5
4.7
4.8
4.9
4.8
4.8
(1.0)
(0.8)
(0.6)
(0.3)
(0.8)
(0.7)
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.3
4.1
4.3
(1.1)
(0.9)
(0.8)
(1.0)
(1.0)
(1.0)
4.0
4.2
4.3
4.3
4.2
4.2
(1.1)
(1.1)
(0.9)
(0.9)
(1.1)
(1.0)
G
rades
4.2
4.2
4.1
4.0
4.0
4.1
(0.8)
(0.7)
(0.8)
(0.8)
(0.7)
(0.8)
Errors Found
2.7
1.7
1.5
1.5
1.9
1.8
(12.2)
(2.9)
(1.0)
(1.0)
(1.5)
(5.5)
O
w
n Errors
55.9
54.8
42.3
60.9
38.1
50.5
(114.8)
(145.4)
(78.9)
(128.8)
(107.0)
(116.8)
O
bservations
67
79
76
88
76
386
Respect for 
Parents
Respect for 
S
upervisor
Respect for 
Police
Tab
le 1
: S
u
m
m
ary S
tatistics b
y Treatm
en
t G
rou
p
Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Peer	  Average	  Split 0.34 0.89 -­‐0.58 0.067
(0.21) (0.55) (-­‐0.21) (0.33)
Peer	  Random	  Split 1.42 1.35 -­‐1.56 3.02
(0.87) (0.84) (-­‐0.55) (0.15)
Computer	  Random	  Split -­‐2.81* -­‐2.65* -­‐5.94** -­‐0.87
(-­‐1.77) (-­‐1.64) (-­‐2.10) (-­‐0.45)
Computer	  Modification 0.53 1.91 -­‐0.15 1.74
(0.33) (1.17) (-­‐0.05) (0.88)
Controls N Y Y Y
Observations 386 356 154 202
Notes:	  t	  statistics	  in	  parentheses.	  Control	  is	  the	  omitted	  category.
* p	  <	  0.10,	  **	  p	  <	  0.05,	  ***	  p	  <	  0.01
Bonus	  Split
Table	  2:	  Altruism	  by	  Treatment	  Group
Full	  Sample
Appendix Figure 1: Placeholder Task at Amazon Mechanical 
Turk 
Transcribe Text 
Instructions: 
• After you have read the instructions, go to this site to begin work: Please Right
Click Here (to open job in a new window)
• Copy text exactly as it appears in the scanned image.
Payment: 
• You will receive 10 cent reward for completing the first paragraph. You can earn
much more in bonus.
• When you complete the survey at the end, you will receive a completion code in
order to receive payment.
You MUST keep this window open in order to enter the completion code. Bonuses will 
be paid after the HIT expires or after the work has been completed. 
Enter completion code here: 
Appendix Figure 2: First Page at External Host 
Introduction 
Task: 
You will be presented with three (3) text paragraphs. Please enter the paragraphs word-
for-word in the text box below each paragraph, ignoring hyphenation. For example, if a 
word is split over two lines, i.e. "cup-cake," type "cupcake." Once you have transcribed 
as many paragraphs as you would like, hit "next," leaving the text-boxes blank - you will 
eventually get to the last questions. 
Payment: 
You must complete at least 3 paragraphs to have your work accepted.  A sample 
paragraph is shown below. Note: Once you click "Next" you will not be able to navigate 
to previous pages. 
De jaarlijkse arbeid van elk volk is het fonds die oorspronkelijk levert hij met alle 
benodigdheden en conveniencies van het leven die het jaarlijks verbruikt, en die altijd 
bestaan, hetzij in de onmiddellijke produceren van die arbeid, of in wat wordt gekocht 
met die van andere landen. Volgens dus, als deze producten, of wat is gekocht met het, 
draagt een grotere of kleinere verhouding tot het aantal van degenen die zijn om te 
consumeren, het volk zal beter of slechter geleverd met alle de benodigdheden en 
conveniencies waarvoor zij gelegenheid. Maar dit deel moet in elk volk worden geregeld 
door twee verschillende 
Appendix Figure 3: Sixth Page at External Host – Task to 
Check 
Below is the transcription work of another Mechanical Turk Worker. Please 
compare the scanned text and their answer and assess their work.  
Consistently since Kihlberg the Supreme Court has upheld as conclusive on both 
parties decisions made under finality clauses of government contracts by applying 
to such contracts the same principles as are applied to contracts between private 
persons. Decisions under finality clauses of government contracts have been 
upheld, regardless of whether the decision was on a simple question of fact, such 
as the mileage between two points, or a decision calling for the application of 
expert knowledge and experience, such as an appraisal or accounting 
determination, or a complicated mixed question of law and facts, such as the 
interpretations of contr- act specifications. Before any appeal boards were ever 
established, the Supreme Court upheld decisions under finality clauses regardless 
of whether made on-the-spot by the government officer directly involved in the 
dispute without any right of appeal or made by a higher level review or appellate 
authority. The conclusive effect of such decisions did not turn on the 
independence, impartiality or disinterestedness of the government officer who 
made the decision, the opportunity of the contractor to present evidence in 
support of his position, or what evidence the officer making the decision had to 
support his decision. 
Consistently since Kihlberg the Supreme Court has upheld as conclusive on both parties 
decisions made under finality clauses of government contracts by applying to such 
contracts the same principalss as are applied to contracts between private persons. 
Decisions under finality clauses of government contracts have been upheld, regardless of 
whether the decision was on a simple question of fact, such as the mileage between two 
points, or a decision calling for the application of expert knowledge and experience, such 
as an appraisal or accounting determination, or a complicated mixed question of law and 
facts, such as the interpretation of contract specifications. Before any appeal boards were 
ever established, the Supreme Court upheld decisions under finality clauses regardless of 
whether made on-the-spot by the government officer directly involved in the dispute 
without any right of appeal or made by a higher level review or appellate authority. The 
conclusive effect of such decisions did not turn on the independence, impartiality or 
disinterestedness of the government officer who made the decision, the opportunity of the 
contractor to present evidence in support of his position, or what evidence the officer 
making the decision had to support his dicision. 
How many errors did you find? 
How would you rate the quality of the other worker's work? 
Very Low 
Low 
Fair  
High 
Very High 
Appendix Figure 4a: Seventh Page at External Host – Sharing 
Bonus (Split – Treatment Group 1 (Control)) 
You and the worker whose work you have just graded will receive a bonus. You will 
determine how the bonus is divided. 
How much of a 50 cent bonus would you like to share with the other worker? 
Appendix Figure 4b: Seventh Page at External Host – Sharing 
Bonus (Peer Average Split – Treatment Group 2) 
You and the worker whose work you have just graded will receive a bonus. For accuracy, 
two other people have also graded the worker's assignment. Each grader will propose 
how to share a 50 cent bonus with the worker. We will average your evaluations and 
distribute the bonus accordingly. 
How much of a 50 cent bonus would you like to share with the other worker? 
Appendix Figure 4c: Seventh Page at External Host – Sharing 
Bonus (Peer Random Split – Treatment Group 3) 
You and the worker whose work you have just graded will receive a bonus. For accuracy, 
two other people have also graded the worker's assignment. Each grader will propose 
how to share a 50 cent bonus with the worker. One of your proposed splits will be chosen 
at random to be implemented. 
How much of a 50 cent bonus would you like to share with the other worker? 
Appendix Figure 4d: Seventh Page at External Host – Sharing 
Bonus (Computer Random Split – Treatment Group 4) 
You and the worker whose work you have just graded will receive a bonus. You will 
propose a split of the 50 cent bonus. Your work helps us validate a new computer grading 
program that is still rough. There is a 2/3 probability that the program's proposed split 
will be implemented instead of your proposal. 
How much of a 50 cent bonus would you like to share with the other worker? 
Appendix Figure 4e: Seventh Page at External Host – Sharing 
Bonus (Computer Modification – Treatment Group 5) 
You and the worker whose work you have just graded will receive a bonus. You will 
propose a split of the 50 cent bonus. Your work helps us validate a new computer grading 
program that is still rough. The program will modify your proposed split, which will then 
be implemented. 
How much of a 50 cent bonus would you like to share with the other worker? 
Appendix Figure 5: Seventeenth Page at External Host – 
Demographic Survey 
What is your gender?  
What is your age?  
What country do you live in? 
How much do you respect: 
Your parents, the police, your boss/supervisor at work? 
Not at all 
Not much 
Some 
A little 
A lot 
What is your religion?  
How often do you attend religious services? (answers may be approximate) 
Never 
Once a year 
Once a month 
Once a week  
Multiple times a week 
Please click on this link to get your completion code (it will open as a new window): 
Enter the code below AND on the Mechanical Turk website.
